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M. Collins
Searle is a philosopher at the Uni-
of California at Berkeley. In 1984
delivered the BBC Reith lectures,
nting his reputation as one of  the
est a n d  mos t  forceful thinkers
d. He is probably best known out-
he professional heartland for  his
ese room' argument against artificial
gence, which he repeated i n  his
lectures. Searle imagined a person
room managing conversational inter-
ges i n  Chinese b y  manipulating
ese word-symbols according to a rule
the person i n  the room might
might not understand Chinese. Thus
e proved to nearly everyone's satis-
n that symbol manipulation is not
same as understanding.
his latest book, Searle looks at the
sciences. The title is provocative in
it contrasts with that o f  a famous
by Peter Berger and Thomas Luck-
, The Social Construction of  Reality
7). Searle aims to show the difference
een what can and what cannot be
-ally constructed. On the way he devel-
a refreshingly clear exposition of the
ems o f  the social sciences, in  the
ve sense o f  problems tha t  a re
cult and interesting.
arle explains that the social sciences,
posed to the natural sciences, have to
with things that exist only because we
they exist. Take paper money: on the
hand there is the actual paper and
mg; on the other hand there is the
e that resides in money only so long as
one continues to believe, act and talk
ough it is valuable. (Searle includes
excellent discussion o f  the role o f
age in the creation of  'institutional
'.) Once people stop thinking, talking
acting collectively as though money is
ble, it stops being valuable. This is a
osophical puzzle because money is at
at real in its effects as subatomic
-cles — as the frustrated builders of
Superconducting Super  Col l ider
Searle thinks, then, that there is
al construction o f  social things and
t these things are nevertheless real.
nce one sees that things that exist
because we think they exist affect all
lives in a way that is as concrete as can
the recent arguments between natural
social scientists are put into context.
al scientists are surprised that natural
ntists have difficulty with this kind of
For example, Richard Dawkins
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Construction of  Social Reality. By
R. Searle. Free Press/Allen Lane:
Pp. 241. $25, £20.
insists that there are no social construe-
tivist at 30,000 feet who aren't hypocrites,
yet if he has money in his pocket he is a
social constructivist himself.
Where Searle differs from what he
perceives to be the view of social construe-
tivists is that he thinks the existence of
social things presupposes a class of things
that are there whether we think about
them or not. I  leave the details o f  the
argument to the reader. Agree with him
or not, in putting the matter so clearly.
Searle shows the way to the interesting
questions. Is it true that social things are
based on nonsocial things? I f  it is true,
where is the boundary between social and
nonsocial? How do we tel l  where the
boundary is? What constraints do non-
social things place on the construction of
social things and vice versa? If some social
scientists have overstepped the boundary
— and this may be the cause of the heat in
recent debates — how can we argue the
matter sensibly? How can we investigate
the way in which facts come into being
without each side simply trying to impose
its authority?
Harry Collins is at the Science Studies Cen-
tre, University of Bath, Bath BA2 7AY, UK.
Science evolving
Ray Percival
Evolutionary Naturalism. B y  Michael
Ruse. Routledge: 1995. Pp. 316. 135,
$49.95.
MICHAEL Ruse aims t o  describe what
scientists actually do in their research and
how they arrive at their theories —  a
mixed bag o f  false starts, fallacious
reasoning, the cultivation o f  followers,
the marketing o f  ideas and so on. His
approach, evolutionary naturalism, rejects
the traditional distinction between the
normative and the descriptive analysis of
science. For him the path of discovery to,
say, Darwin's theory of  natural selection
makes a difference to the theory itself,
whereas for the normative analyst it is just
history. Normative analysts (who probably
include most readers of Nature) would say
that the logical structure of the theory, its
truth or falsity and its relevance to the
objective problem can al l  be assessed
independently of the route of discovery.
A scientist's problem is to produce an
explanatory theory of  greater truth and
depth than any rival theory; a look at the
path o f  discovery might give us hints
about how t o  interpret this objective
problem situation. But, having said that,
it is  important to  distinguish between
Kekule's tail-biting snakes a n d  h i s
problem situation ( h o w  t o  explain
benzene phenomena), a  distinction one
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wishes Ruse had explored systematically.
It is worth stressing that problems,
which Ruse (following the philosopher
Larry Laudan) believes introduce a n
obviously subjective element, can b e
treated as objective abstract entities. Any-
one who doubts this can consult the
surprisingly interesting Guidelines f o r
Examination in the European Patent Office
(European Patent Office, 1994). It is clear
from this document that a person's subjec-
tive conception of  an objective problem
may be wrong and may fail to be decisive
in the eventual solution. Ruse writes as if
Karl Popper never said a  word about
the evolution of scientific theories from
objective problems.
Ruse's use of Thomas Kuhn to under-
mine Popper's falsification theory is a
weak assault on normative analysis. In the
Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1962), Kuhn says
that "[no] process yet disclosed by the his-
torical study of scientific development at
all resembles the methodological stereo-
type of falsification by direct comparison
with nature". This passage is the start of
the myth that Popper was a naive falsifica-
tionist (that is, someone who believes
in conclusive falsification) and o f  the
confusion that his falsificationism was
an historical thesis. Falsificationism was
meant as a normative proposal based on a
logical analysis of the situation facing the
scientist eager to  learn from mistakes
made in  blindly groping for  the truth.
Only secondarily was it meant to suggest
what actually happens in science. Never-
theless, there are many interesting exam-
ples that  conform t o  the  pattern o f
Popper's conjecture and refutation, for
example Rutherford's refutation of J. J.
Thomson's theory of the atom in 1911.
(For more, see Popper's Realism and the
Aim of Science, Hutchison, 1983).
There are two strange things about
the above passage from Kuhn. First, we
are supposed to regard it as a falsification
of falsificationism. But why should we, if,
as Ruse insists, scientists ignore falsifica-
tions? The naturalist does not have an
answer, because he cannot tell you what
you should or  should not do. Second,
rhetorically the argument trades on the
tacit assumption that scientists mostly get
things mostly right (and if  there is a best
method, then they will be using this soon
if not now). But, being fallible, all of them
may one day get i t  not just mostly, but
completely wrong (or at least overlook a
better method). And in fact, they have.
The naturalist defines away this possibil-
ity. The normative analyst can also ask:
how can we promote the growth of scien-
tific knowledge? What method(s) should
the scientist adopt if this is his aim? How
should w e  control error? A l l  these
questions are lost in naturalism.
Ruse does shy away from a crude scien-
tism that says that all problems can be
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solved by science, but there are many
forms o f  naturalism and i t  is unclear
exactly where Ruse stands (see Susan
Haack's Evidence and Enquiry (Blackwell,
1993) for clear distinctions and refutations
of some forms of naturalism).
In the section on evolutionary episte-
mology, Ruse argues t h a t  scientific
thinking (indeed, all thinking) is to be
understood with the help of "epigenetic
rules". These are rules of  thinking that
we are disposed to follow because of our
evolutionary history, such as the law of
non-contradiction. I f  our ancestors were
inclined to regard sabre-toothed tigers as
both dangerous and not dangerous at the
same time, they would not have been our
ancestors. The approach is much more
promising than that of, say, the philos-
opher David Hull, who sees the scientific
success of a theory simply in terms of the
proliferation of memetic copies, without
considering the rational filters at work.
But, although promising, Ruse's approach
shows its defects when he goes on to say
that the necessity of logical rules is based
on nothing but our feelings of necessity
shaped by evolution. He neglects the fact
that conforming t o  the  law o f  non-
contradiction saves us from moving in an
argument from true premises to a false
conclusion, and also enables us to test the
implications of  our theories (because a
false conclusion o f  a  valid argument
implies a false premise). Logical necessity
and validity are emergent properties of
language and cannot be defined in terms
of feelings (evolved or not).
Such a  view also neglects the most
interesting thing about evolution — the
emergence of radically new structures and
properties not fully derivable from, con-
tained in or explicable by those that came
before. Once we  have language, f o r
instance, we can build theories that no
one person can fully grasp: they are no
longer just a  part o f  our psychology.
Perhaps the ability to count, for example,
was selected phylogenetically, but after
Godel's famous incompleteness proof, we
must say that the linguistically formulated
theory of  natural numbers has unfath-
omable content and that this is a fact inde-
pendent o f  the way we feel about the
proof. I f  this is not enough to convince
Ruse that we are capable of  producing
systems that have independent properties,
I  would suggest looking at Danny Hillis's
work, which suggests that self-evolving
computer programs may produce per-
fectly working airline navigation systems
containing millions of  lines o f  program
that nobody could possibly understand.
There arc surely elements of marketing
in the selection of scientific theories, but,
i f  one wants to know about that, it is wise
to consult advertising and marketing
specialists. At the end of the day we have
still to analyse what is the best method for
enhancing the growth of scientific truth.
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We can teach students how t o  falsify
theories and how to  obtain jobs, and
with enough ingenuity, there need be
no conflict.
I have focused mainly on a few prob-
lems in Evolutionary Naturalism, but i t
covers in an informative way many other
interesting areas. In the discussion of evo-
lutionary ethics, for example, Ruse argues
that our morals are, like our logic, based
on biological evolution. The book is a
readable and forthright presentation o f
his views on the relevance of evolution to
philosophy and could serve as a useful
introduction for students.
Ray Percival, an associate editor of Journal
Relative values
Sean Nee
Macroecology. B y  J a m e s  H .  B rown .
University o f  Chicago P r e s s :  1 9 9 5 _
Pp. 269. $42.50, 133.95 (hbk); $15.95,
112.75 (pbk).
FROM 1736, generations of the Marsham
family, who lived near Norwich, England,
each year meticulously recorded facts
such as the dates of the first snowdrops
and cuckoos, resulting in an invaluable
data set for studying how species respond
to variations in climate. Darwin provides
the best example o f  how endless cata-
logues of facts about natural history, each
fairly dull in itself, can be illuminating
when looked at, imaginatively, as a whole.
This stamp-collecting instinct is rife in
ecology. Starlings weigh 80 grams and
four million of them live in Sweden. Ecol-
ogists do not of course stare blankly at
these facts, mesmerized. Rather, they ask
how and why starling numbers have
changed over time, and how a starling's
weight affects its chances of surviving the
winter. These questions take us in one
direction, towards the particular. James
Brown invites us to go in the other direc-
tion and to ask, for example, about the
relationship between body size and abun-
dance of birds in general — that is, to put
all the facts into one big data set, to find
empirical generalizations and to  t ry to
understand them.
Clearly, there are many permutations.
If we just look at the shape of the distribu-
tion of  bird body sizes, we see that i t  is
skewed, with many more small species
than medium or large ones. This is true
not only for birds but for mammals, fish,
trees, bacteria and insects as well, suggest-
ing that there is a general principle to be
unearthed. The main variables for which
macroecologists have data are the body
size, abundance, habitat specificity and
geographical range of species, providing
us with spaces of up to four dimensions in
which to plot species points and look for
interesting features in the resulting cloud.
Brown demonstrates that with imaginative
use of these data, meaningful hypotheses
can be posed and many of their implica-
tions can be tested.
This is not a  "radical new research
agenda", as the publishers would have us
believe, although i t  is  interesting and
important, and this is the first book to
package the field for wide consumption.
But i t  does contain some radical ideas.
For example, Brown offers an argument
to explain the distribution of animal body
sizes that defines fitness as the rate at
which animals invest energy in reproduc-
tion. Because this invites us to discard
current theories of life-history evolution,
the author indeed "makes a major intel-
lectual leap", but perhaps into the abyss.
Our thinking about allometry is also
challenged. I t  is well known that larger
mammals live longer, bear fewer young,
have higher metabolic rates and so on. In
other words, the relationship between
body size and just about everything else is
mono-tonic. Brown suggests that many of
these relationships may in fact be triangu-
lar, with very small-bodied species show-
ing the opposite overall trend. If true, this
would be important. But so, far there is
only anecdotal evidence, with one excep-
tion. Certain data sets reveal a triangular
relationship between body size and abun-
dance, with the most abundant species
having intermediate sizes. B u t  i t  has
been argued in  the literature that the
relationship is merely a sampling artefact,
although Brown does not mention this.
In fact, there is much that Brown does
not discuss, and other macroecologists
reading this book wil l ,  qui te rightly,
be annoyed by the extent to which their
work is ignored. One is given no hint,
for example, tha t  people have been
using species–area relationships to predict
extinctions for decades before the publica-
tion of a paper coauthored by Brown in
- 1992, which gets a chapter al l  to itself.
Nevertheless, Brown is a dominant figure
in this field and his work is a suitable
vantage point fo r  an overview o f  the
macroecological research programme
Sean Nee is in the Department of Zoology,
University o f  Oxford, South Parks Road,
Oxford OXI, 3PS, UK.
•The Chambers Dictionary of Science and
Technology is 55  years old this year and
was l as t  revised seven years ago. The
seventh edition, edited by  Peter Walker,
has just been published as the Larousse
Dictionary of  Science and Technology. I ts
1,236 pages contain 49,000 entries, over
500 illustrations and many appendices.
Larousse, £45 (hbk),1,19.99 (pbk).
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